Samuel Alexander


Australian-born British Philosopher, first Jewish Fellow of an Oxbridge College

Author Quotes

The sensory acts are accordingly distinguished by their objects.

The thing of which the act of perception is the perception is experienced as something not mental.

Theoretical acts of mind are such as subserve the continuance of the object before the mind without alteration of it.

Thus a remembered object (event) is remembered as mine.

Thus the same object may supply a practical perception to one person and a speculative one to another, or the same person may perceive it partly practically and partly speculatively.

Thus we have to recognize that a thing as perceived contains besides sensory elements other elements present to the mind only in ideal form.

Time is the Mind of Space.

True, also, the psychosis is a different one according as the object is a sensum, an ideatum, etc; or according to the various sensory qualities of the object; or according to the various categories under which he thing presents itself.

We cannot tell why one sensory process should make us see green and another make us see blue and another make us smell scent.

We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

The difference in the perceiving of a star and a tree is a variation in some intrinsic character which belongs to conation as such.

What is the meaning of the togetherness of the perceiving mind, in that peculiar modification of perceiving which makes it perceive not a star but a tree, and the tree itself, is a problem for philosophy.

The great usefulness of speculation for mental life lies in its thus suspending practice and introducing consideration.

What the occasions are which lead to the emergence of free images is no means clear.

The interval between a cold expectation and a warm desire may be filled by expectations of varying degrees of warmth or by desires of varying degrees of coldness.

When we come to images or memories or thoughts, speculation, while always closely related to practice, is more explicit, and it is in fact not immediately obvious that such processes can be described in any sense as practical.

The mental act of sensation which issues in reflex movement is so simple as to defy analysis.

You can mark in desire the rising of the tide, as the appetite more and more invades the personality, appealing, as it does, not merely to the sensory side of the self, but to its ideal components as well.

The perceptive act is a reaction of the mind upon the object of which it is the perception.

The reproductive conation means anyhow the existence in the mind of a conation in the absence of the memory object or rather in the absence of objects revealed as sensory.

It is a different and independent thing, and the character of the mental act only determines how much of the object is apprehended and in what form.

A conational psychology may accordingly with perfect correctness employ this resource on the same principle as we infer from a man's energetic language the strength of his sentiments.

It is convenient to distinguish the two kinds of experience which have thus been described, the experienc-ing and the experienc-ed, by technical words.

A mental act is cognitive only in the sense that it takes place in reference to some object, which is said to be known.

It is more difficult to designate this form of conation on its practical side by a satisfactory name.

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Australian-born British Philosopher, first Jewish Fellow of an Oxbridge College