American Political Scientist, Political Economist and Author
Francis Fukuyama, fully Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama
American Political Scientist, Political Economist and Author
We are taking the time to consider the Hungarian case for a simple reason: to show that constitutional limits on a central government?s power do not by themselves necessarily produce political accountability. The freedom sought by the Hungarian noble class was the freedom to exploit their own peasants more thoroughly, and the absence of a strong central state allowed them to do just that. Everyone understands the Chinese form of tyranny, one perpetrated by a centralized dictatorship. But tyranny can result from decentralized oligarchic domination as well. True freedom tends to emerge in the interstices of a balance of power among a society?s elite actors, something that Hungary never succeeded in achieving.
Whether he was conscious of it or not, Deng was restoring much of the institutional legacy of traditional Chinese government. Only this time, it was the Communist Party that played the role of the emperor with his eunuch cadres supervising a vast bureaucracy.
The fact that you are not sure means that it is possible that there is another way someday.
The nation will continue to be a central pole of identification, even if more and more nations come to share common economic and political forms of organization.
The same process is unfolding in the early twenty-first century with passage of the Dodd-Frank bill regulating the financial sector: Congress delegated to the regulators the responsibility of writing many of the detailed provisions, which will inevitably be challenged in the courts. Ironically, excessive delegation and vetocracy are intertwined.
These aren't two separate problems. In many instances the responses are the same.
We can say in confidence that the twentieth century has been instilling in all of us profoundly historically pessimistic perspective.
While Koreans also are relatively group-oriented, they also have a strong individualistic streak like most Westerners. Koreans frequently joke that an individual Korean can beat an individual Japanese, but that a group of Koreans are certain to be beaten by a group of Japanese.36 The rate of employee turnover, raiding of other companies? skilled labor, and the like are all higher in Korea than in Japan. Anecdotally, there would seem to be a lower level of informal work-oriented socializing in Korea than in Japan, with employees heading home to their families at the end of the day rather than staying on to drink in the evenings with their workmates.
All fundamental processes are reversible.
Between democracy and rule of law: There has always been a close historical association between the rise of democracy and the rise of liberal rule of law? the rise of accountable government in England was inseparable from the defense of the Common Law. Extension of the rule of law to apply to wider circles of citizens has always been seen as a key component of democracy itself. This association has continued through the third-wave democratic transitions after 1975, where the collapse of Communist dictatorships led to both the rise of electoral democracy and the creation of constitutional governments protecting individuals? rights.
Democracy in the developed world became secure and stable as industrialization produced middle-class societies, that is, societies in which a significant majority of the population thought of themselves as middle class.
Free markets are necessary to promote long-term growth, but they are not self-regulating, particularly when it comes to banks and other large financial institutions.
I THE IDEA OF TRUST: The Improbable Power of Culture in the Making of Economic Society
In societies where most politicians are corrupt, singling one out for punishment is often not a sign of reform but of a power grab.
It's easy to misunderstand and abuse the role of culture.
Most people living in rich, stable developed countries have no idea how Denmark itself got to be Denmark?something that is true for many Danes as well. The struggle to create modern political institutions was so long and so painful that people living in industrialized countries now suffer from a historical amnesia regarding how their societies came to that point in the first place.
Political scientist Ronald Inglehart, who has overseen the massive World Values Survey that seeks to measure value change around the world, has argued that economic modernization and middle-class status produce what he calls post-material values in which democracy, equality, and identity issues become much more prominent than older issues of economic distribution.
Striking characteristics to look for revolutionary positions that the events that drive people to do the greatest risks, and that lead to the collapse of governments, is seldom the big events described by the historians Subsequent to the root causes of the revolution, and it is a small events seem opposed.
All theoretical chemistry is really physics; and all theoretical chemists know it.
Between economic growth and social development, or the development of civil society A lot of classic social theory links the emergence of modern civil society to economic development. Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations noted that the growth of markets was related to the division of labor in society: as markets expand and firms take advantage of economies of scale, social specialization increases and new social groups (for example, the industrial working class) emerge. The fluidity and open access demanded by modern market economies undermine many traditional forms of social authority and force their replacement with more flexible, voluntary forms of association. The theme of the transformative effects of the expanding division of labor was central to the writings of nineteenth-century thinkers like Karl Marx, Max Weber, and mile Durkheim.
Diego Gambetta, however, presents an elegant economic theory of the Mafia?s origins: mafiosi are private entrepreneurs whose function is to provide protection of individual property rights in a society in which the state fails to perform this basic service. That is, if one party to a private transaction is cheated by the other, he would normally take his partner to court in a well-ordered rule-of-law society. But where the state is corrupt, unreliable, or perhaps altogether absent, one must turn instead to a private provider of protection and task him to threaten to break the legs of the other party if he doesn?t pay up. By this account, the Mafia is simply a private organization providing a needed service that is normally performed by the state?that is, use of the threat of violence (and sometimes actual violence) to enforce property rights. Gambetta shows that the Mafia arose precisely in those parts of southern Italy where there was economic conflict over land, mobile wealth and a high volume of transactions, and political discord in connection with the changes taking place in the nature of the Italian state after 1860.
Friction-Free Economies: Why is it necessary to turn to a cultural characteristic like spontaneous sociability to explain the existence of large-scale corporations in an economy, or prosperity more generally? Wasn?t the modern system of contract and commercial law invented precisely to get around the need for business associates to trust one another as family members do? Advanced industrialized societies have created comprehensive legal frameworks for economic organization and a wide variety of juridical forms, from individual proprietorships to large, publicly traded multinational enterprises. Most economists would add rational individual self-interest to this stew to explain how modern organizations arise. Don?t businesses based on strong family ties and unstated moral obligations degenerate into nepotism, cronyism, and generally bad business decision making? Indeed, isn?t the very essence of modern economic life the replacement of informal moral obligations with formal, transparent legal ones? The answer to these questions is that although property rights and other modern economic institutions were necessary for the creation of modern businesses, we are often unaware that the latter rest on a bedrock of social and cultural habits that are too often taken for granted. Modern institutions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for modern prosperity and the social well-being that it undergirds; they have to be combined with certain traditional social and ethical habits if they are to work properly. Contracts allow strangers with no basis for trust to work with one another, but the process works far more efficiently when the trust exists. Legal forms like joint-stock companies may allow unrelated people to collaborate, but how easily they do so depend on their cooperativeness when dealing with non-kin.
I think that I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.
In spite of the strength shown by Islam in the current revival, say that this religion is hardly his attractive outside areas that were originally in the Islamic civilization. It would appear that time more Islamic cultural expansion has passed. The Islam was able to gain from the new loyalty apostates with him, he will not coincide Hui in the hearts of the Berlin youth, or Tokyo, or Moscow, and despite the fact that nearly a billion people condemn the religion of Islam (i.e., a fifth of the world's population) it is not impossible for us to liberal democracy challenge in its territory on intellectual level. It may even seem to be the Muslim world's most vulnerable to liberal ideas on long - term possibility that the opposite happens, as such liberalism has attracted many supporters to herself and her strong among Muslims, over the last century and a half century. In fact, the reason for the current revival of fundamentalism is a significant risk on the part of liberal Western values ??on traditional Islamic societies force.
I've always had a Marxist understanding of history: democracy is a result of a broad modernization process that happens in every country. Neocons think the use of political power can force the pace of change, but ultimately it depends on societies doing it themselves.