American Political Scientist, Political Economist and Author
Francis Fukuyama, fully Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama
American Political Scientist, Political Economist and Author
Most serious and systematic attempts to write Universal Histories saw the central issue in history as the development of Freedom. History was not a blind concatenation of events, but a meaningful whole in which human ideas concerning the nature of a just political and social order developed and played themselves out. And if we are now at a point where we cannot imagine a world substantially different from our own, in which there is no apparent or obvious way in which the future will represent a fundamental improvement over our current order, then we must also take into consideration the possibility that History itself might be at an end.
President Bush has made some statements suggesting the US would accept whatever democratic outcome comes. Should the US be willing to do that, it suggests a major change in their position. But I think it is a little premature to assume that any real decision has been made. I think what they -- in the US administration -- are hoping for is a more gradual reform process in the Arab world, a more gradual expansion of political participation which Islamist groups do not use as an opportunity to come to power. So while I think there has been a shift in the US Middle East policy we will all have to wait to see how great that shift has been.
Suicidal destruction caused by the European system of the state during the two world wars and the demolition of the idea of the superiority of Western rationality, while became difficult to distinguish between the civilized and the barbaric is the distinction was instinctively to the Europeans in the nineteenth century.
Among ideas, legitimacy, and all of the other dimensions of development Ideas concerning legitimacy develop according to their own logic, but they are also shaped by economic, political, and social development. The history of the twentieth century would have looked quite different without the writings of an obscure scribbler in the British Library, Karl Marx, who systematized a critique of early capitalism. Similarly, communism collapsed in 1989 largely because few people any longer believed in the foundational ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Conversely, developments in economics and politics affect the kinds of ideas that people regard as legitimate. The Rights of Man seemed more plausible to French people because of the changes that had taken place in France?s class structure and the rising expectations of the new middle classes in the later eighteenth century. The spectacular financial crises and economic setbacks of 1929?1931 undermined the legitimacy of certain capitalist institutions and led the way to the legitimization of greater state control over the economy. The subsequent growth of large welfare states, and the economic stagnation and inflation that they appeared to encourage, laid the groundwork for the conservative Reagan-Thatcher revolutions of the 1980s. Similarly, the failure of socialism to deliver on its promises of modernization and equality led to its being discredited in the minds of many who lived under communism. Economic growth can also create legitimacy for the governments that succeed in fostering it. Many fast-developing countries in East Asia, such as Singapore and Malaysia, have maintained popular support despite their lack of liberal democracy for this reason. Conversely, the reversal of economic growth through economic crisis or mismanagement can be destabilizing, as it was for the dictatorship in Indonesia after the financial crisis of 1997?1998. Legitimacy also rests on the distribution of the benefits of growth. Growth that goes to a small oligarchy at the top of the society without being broadly shared often mobilizes social groups against the political system. This is what happened in Mexico under the dictatorship of Porfirio D¡az, who ruled the country from 1876 to 1880 and again from 1884 to 1911. National income grew rapidly in this period, but property rights existed only for a wealthy elite, which set the stage for the Mexican Revolution of 1911 and a long period of civil war and instability as underprivileged groups fought for their share of national income. In more recent times, the legitimacy of democratic systems in Venezuela and Bolivia has been challenged by populist leaders whose political base is poor and otherwise marginalized groups.
Between economic growth and stable democracy: The correlation between development and democracy was first noted by the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset in the late 1950s, and ever since then there have been many studies linking development to democracy. The relationship between growth and democracy may not be linear?that is, more growth does not necessarily always produce more democracy. The economist Robert Barro has shown that the correlation is stronger at lower levels of income and weaker at middle levels. One of the most comprehensive studies of the relationship between development and democracy shows that transitions into democracy from autocracy can occur at any level of development but are much less likely to be reversed at higher levels of per capita GDP.27 Whereas growth appears to favor stable democracy, the reverse causal connection between democracy and growth is much less clear. This stands to reason if we simply consider the number of authoritarian countries that have piled up impressive growth records over recent years?South Korea and Taiwan while they were ruled dictatorially, the People?s Republic of China, Singapore, Indonesia under Suharto, and Chile under Augusto Pinochet. Thus, while having a coherent state and reasonably good governance is a condition for growth, it is not clear that democracy plays the same positive role.
Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast have an alternative label for neopatrimonialism, what they call a limited access order, in which a coalition of rent-seeking elites use their political power to prevent free competition in both the economy and the political system. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson use the term extractive to describe the same phenomenon. At one stage in human history, all governments could be described as patrimonial, limited access, or extractive.
From the earlier discussion of Europe in the nineteenth century, however, it should be clear that the middle classes are not inevitably supporters of democracy. This tends to be particularly true when the middle classes still constitute a minority of the population.
I was born not knowing and have had only a little time to change that here and there.
In the future the optimal form of industrial organization will be neither small companies nor large ones but network structures that share the advantages of both.
I've figured out in the course of my life that the one thing I'm good at doing is writing books, and it would be crazy to trade that in for something else.
Much of what passes for corruption is not simply a matter of greed but rather the by-product of legislators or public officials who feel more obligated to family, tribe, region, or ethnic group than to the national community and therefore divert money in that direction.
Religion is a culture of faith; science is a culture of doubt.
Tenure In general, Americans are not very good at nation-building and not very good colonialists.
An industrial policy worked in Taiwan only because the state was able to shield its planning technocrats from political pressures so that they could reinforce the market and make decisions according to criteria of efficiency?in other words, worked because Taiwan was not governed democratically. An American industrial policy is much less likely to improve its economic competitiveness, precisely because America is more democratic than Taiwan or the Asian NIEs. The planning process would quickly fall prey to pressures from Congress either to protect inefficient industries or to promote ones
Between rule of law and growth In the academic literature, the rule of law is sometimes considered a component of governance and sometimes considered a separate dimension of development (as I am doing here? the key aspects of rule of law that are linked to growth are property rights and contract enforcement. There is a large literature demonstrating that this correlation exists. Most economists take this relationship for granted, though it is not clear that universal and equal property rights are necessary for this to happen. In many societies, stable property rights exist only for certain elites, and this is sufficient to produce growth for at least certain periods of time. Furthermore, societies like contemporary China with good enough property rights that yet lack traditional rule of law can nonetheless achieve very high levels of growth.
Economic activity is carried out by individuals in organizations that require a high degree of social co-operation.
Germany, in other words, developed both a strong state and rule of law early on, well before it developed accountable government.
I'd hate to die twice. It's so boring.
In the hands of good leaders, such a system can actually perform better than a democratic system that is subject to rule of law and formal democratic procedures like multiparty elections. It can make large, difficult decisions without being hampered by interest groups, lobbying, litigation, or the need to form cumbersome political coalitions or educate the public as to their own self-interest.
Karl Marx says: ?It was Hegel believed that the work is the true essence of the human being.? If anyone spent for so travel or residence outside the home, cannot help but note how they will affect cultures and national cultures decisive influence on the attitude of the people work... and Thomas Swoal has pointed out that in the United States from a severe differences in income and education between the descendants of blacks who migrated voluntarily from the West Indies, and the descendants of blacks who were brought directly from Africa as slaves... and the fact that the superiority of the Germans honored their neighbors from the Europeans to maintain the industrial skills of great sophistication, is one of the phenomena that are difficult to interpret in the light of the broad economic policies. The final was caused he must have a potential in the cultural field.
My end of history , there are no competitors liberal democracy, and has refused in the past people these liberal democracy in the belief that property and the aristocracy and theocracy, religious , government and totalitarian communism and other ideologies that have agreed to believe the best of them. But now it appears that there is general agreement -ala in the Muslim world to accept the claims of liberal democracy as the most rational judgment Pictures, and is the image of the country that achieve as much as possible to satisfy both the desire of rationality and rational recognition. If so, why all countries outside the Islamic world has not become a democracy? Why is still a difficult transition to democracy for many countries and their people accepted the leadership principles of democracy in theory? Why are we so skeptical about certain systems in various parts of the world now called democracy and it does not will always remain so, while we find other countries can hardly imagine only stable democracies? What's the secret of our belief that the current trend towards liberal vector may recede and fall , although it promises to triumph in the long run?
Rush out the process of democracy will face in the future are also tainted by ambiguity, and with the large number of people in our world that the theoretical level they want democracy and capitalist prosperity will not be available for all to achieve these goals. Victory writes in the future to new authoritarian alternatives. The achieved such alternatives would be to create two contrasting states: States that have failed for reasons of civilization in developing its economy in spite of its attempt to apply the economic liberalism, and states encountered success unusual in the capitalist game. And we had seen in the past, like the first phenomenon, and is the emergence of a hostile theories of liberalism as a result of economic failure, movement of the current neighborhoods of Islamic fundamentalism, which are evident in almost all countries of the world with large census of Muslims, it can be considered a reaction to the failure of Muslim societies in general in the nappy on her dignity in the face of non-Muslim West.
That an ethnically divided post-totalitarian state should not make an easy transition to liberal democracy seems obvious to many people in hindsight.
And has been a steady failure encountered communism in their quest to penetrate to the developing world, with the spread in the countries are on the verge of entering into the early stages of manufacturing, suggesting that the temptation of totalitarianism is as described by Walt Rostow transitional stage disease, or is it the case satisfying the needs resulting from the political and social , especially in countries undergoing a certain stage of social and economic development.
Between social mobilization and liberal democracy From Alexis de Tocqueville onward there has been a large body of democratic theory arguing that modern liberal democracy cannot exist without a vigorous civil society. The mobilization of social groups allows weak individuals to pool their interests and enter the political system; even when social groups do not seek political objectives, voluntary associations have spillover effects in fostering the ability of individuals to work with one another in novel situations?what is termed social capital. The correlation noted above linking economic growth to stable liberal democracy presumably comes about via the channel of social mobilization: growth entails the emergence of new social actors who then demand representation in a more open political system and press for a democratic transition. When the political system is well institutionalized and can accommodate these new actors, then there is a successful transition to full democracy. This is what happened with the rise of farmers? movements and socialist parties in Britain and Sweden in the early decades of the twentieth century and in South Korea after the fall of the military dictatorship in 1987. A highly developed civil society can also pose dangers for democracy and can even lead to political decay. Groups based on ethnic or racial chauvinism spread intolerance; interest groups can invest effort in zero-sum rent seeking; excessive politicization of economic and social conflicts can paralyze societies and undermine the legitimacy of democratic institutions. Social mobilization can lead to political decay. The Huntingtonian process whereby political institutions failed to accommodate demands of new social actors for participation arguably happened in Bolivia and Ecuador in the 1990s and 2000s with the repeated unseating of elected presidents by highly mobilized social groups.