American Political Scientist, Political Economist and Author
Francis Fukuyama, fully Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama
American Political Scientist, Political Economist and Author
According to the historian John LeDonne, ?The existence of a national network of families and client systems made a mockery of the rigid hierarchy established by legislative texts in a constant search for administrative order and ?regularity.? It explained why the Russian government, more than any other, was a government of men and not of laws.?
Because culture is a matter of ethical habit, it changes very slowly?much more slowly than ideas. When the Berlin Wall was dismantled and communism crumbled in 1989-1990, the governing ideology in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union changed overnight from Marxism-Leninism to markets and democracy. Similarly, in some Latin American countries, statist or nationalist economic ideologies like import substitution were wiped away in less than a decade by the accession to power of a new president or finance minister. What cannot change nearly as quickly is culture. The experience of many former communist societies is that communism created many habits?excessive dependence on the state, leading to an absence of entrepreneurial energy, an inability to compromise, and a disinclination to cooperate voluntarily in groups like companies or political parties?that have greatly slowed the consolidation of either democracy or a market economy. People in these societies may have given their intellectual assent to the replacement of communism with democracy and capitalism by voting for democratic reformers, but they do not have the social habits necessary to make either work.
Controversy and widespread on the relevance of Nietzsche, German fascism may Dar. Although it is possible to defend him and acquitted of the charge narrow - minded that he was the father of National Socialism and its theories naive, the relationship between the idea and the Nazis is not a coincidence has shaken the relative when Nietzsche -as when his successor Martin Haadger- all philosophical grounds upon which democracy Western liberalism, and it has established its place and dominance theory of force. And Nietzsche believes that the European phase of nihilism, which contributed to the effort launched will lead to a major wars waged by the Spirit and wars are not her goal is to confirm the importance of the war itself.
Free Cities and The Bourgeoisie: Contemporary conventional wisdom has it that democracy will not emerge without the existence of a strong middle class, that is, a group of people who own some property and are neither elites nor the rural poor. This notion finds its origins in English political development, which to a greater degree than any other European country (with the possible exception of Holland) saw the early emergence of cities and an urban-based bourgeoisie. The urban middle class played a key role in Parliament and gained substantial economic and political power well prior to the Civil War and Glorious Revolution. It was a powerful counterweight to the great lords and the king in their three-way contest for power. The rise of an urban bourgeoisie was part of a broader Western European shift that encompassed the Low Countries, northern Italy, and the Hanseatic port cities of northern Germany as well. This important phenomenon has been described at length by authors from Karl Marx to Max Weber to Henri Pirenne. Marx made the rise of the bourgeoisie the centerpiece of his entire theory of modernization, a necessary and inevitable stage in the developmental process of all societies.
I believe that a scientist looking at nonscientific problems is just as dumb as the next guy.
In societies where incomes and educational levels are low, it is often far easier to get supporters to the polls based on a promise of an individual benefit rather than a broad programmatic agenda.
It's a really big mistake to think democratization is a good tool to fight terrorism.
Most neoclassical economists would argue that state-owned firms will inevitably be less efficient than private ones because the state lacks the proper incentives to run enterprises efficiently. The state does not have to fear bankruptcy, since it can keep businesses going out of tax dollars or, at worst, by printing money. It also has strong incentives to use the firm for political ends like job creation and patronage. These deficiencies of public ownership have been the underlying justification for the global move toward privatization over the past decade. But state-owned enterprises can be run more or less efficiently, and any final judgment as to the efficiency price paid for nationalization has to be measured against the entrepreneurial capabilities of that society?s private sector. In France, nationalized companies have often been allowed considerable managerial discretion and operate not much differently from their private sector counterparts.
Political liberty?that is, the ability of societies to rule themselves?does not depend only on the degree to which a society can mobilize opposition to centralized power and impose constitutional constraints on the state. It must also have a state that is strong enough to act when action is required.
State bureaucracy saddled with the laws of the view that the most important national wealth distribution of wealth production.
All fundamental processes are reversible.
Between democracy and rule of law: There has always been a close historical association between the rise of democracy and the rise of liberal rule of law? the rise of accountable government in England was inseparable from the defense of the Common Law. Extension of the rule of law to apply to wider circles of citizens has always been seen as a key component of democracy itself. This association has continued through the third-wave democratic transitions after 1975, where the collapse of Communist dictatorships led to both the rise of electoral democracy and the creation of constitutional governments protecting individuals? rights.
Democracy in the developed world became secure and stable as industrialization produced middle-class societies, that is, societies in which a significant majority of the population thought of themselves as middle class.
Free markets are necessary to promote long-term growth, but they are not self-regulating, particularly when it comes to banks and other large financial institutions.
I THE IDEA OF TRUST: The Improbable Power of Culture in the Making of Economic Society
In societies where most politicians are corrupt, singling one out for punishment is often not a sign of reform but of a power grab.
It's easy to misunderstand and abuse the role of culture.
Most people living in rich, stable developed countries have no idea how Denmark itself got to be Denmark?something that is true for many Danes as well. The struggle to create modern political institutions was so long and so painful that people living in industrialized countries now suffer from a historical amnesia regarding how their societies came to that point in the first place.
Political scientist Ronald Inglehart, who has overseen the massive World Values Survey that seeks to measure value change around the world, has argued that economic modernization and middle-class status produce what he calls post-material values in which democracy, equality, and identity issues become much more prominent than older issues of economic distribution.
Striking characteristics to look for revolutionary positions that the events that drive people to do the greatest risks, and that lead to the collapse of governments, is seldom the big events described by the historians Subsequent to the root causes of the revolution, and it is a small events seem opposed.
All theoretical chemistry is really physics; and all theoretical chemists know it.
Between economic growth and social development, or the development of civil society A lot of classic social theory links the emergence of modern civil society to economic development. Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations noted that the growth of markets was related to the division of labor in society: as markets expand and firms take advantage of economies of scale, social specialization increases and new social groups (for example, the industrial working class) emerge. The fluidity and open access demanded by modern market economies undermine many traditional forms of social authority and force their replacement with more flexible, voluntary forms of association. The theme of the transformative effects of the expanding division of labor was central to the writings of nineteenth-century thinkers like Karl Marx, Max Weber, and mile Durkheim.
Diego Gambetta, however, presents an elegant economic theory of the Mafia?s origins: mafiosi are private entrepreneurs whose function is to provide protection of individual property rights in a society in which the state fails to perform this basic service. That is, if one party to a private transaction is cheated by the other, he would normally take his partner to court in a well-ordered rule-of-law society. But where the state is corrupt, unreliable, or perhaps altogether absent, one must turn instead to a private provider of protection and task him to threaten to break the legs of the other party if he doesn?t pay up. By this account, the Mafia is simply a private organization providing a needed service that is normally performed by the state?that is, use of the threat of violence (and sometimes actual violence) to enforce property rights. Gambetta shows that the Mafia arose precisely in those parts of southern Italy where there was economic conflict over land, mobile wealth and a high volume of transactions, and political discord in connection with the changes taking place in the nature of the Italian state after 1860.
Friction-Free Economies: Why is it necessary to turn to a cultural characteristic like spontaneous sociability to explain the existence of large-scale corporations in an economy, or prosperity more generally? Wasn?t the modern system of contract and commercial law invented precisely to get around the need for business associates to trust one another as family members do? Advanced industrialized societies have created comprehensive legal frameworks for economic organization and a wide variety of juridical forms, from individual proprietorships to large, publicly traded multinational enterprises. Most economists would add rational individual self-interest to this stew to explain how modern organizations arise. Don?t businesses based on strong family ties and unstated moral obligations degenerate into nepotism, cronyism, and generally bad business decision making? Indeed, isn?t the very essence of modern economic life the replacement of informal moral obligations with formal, transparent legal ones? The answer to these questions is that although property rights and other modern economic institutions were necessary for the creation of modern businesses, we are often unaware that the latter rest on a bedrock of social and cultural habits that are too often taken for granted. Modern institutions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for modern prosperity and the social well-being that it undergirds; they have to be combined with certain traditional social and ethical habits if they are to work properly. Contracts allow strangers with no basis for trust to work with one another, but the process works far more efficiently when the trust exists. Legal forms like joint-stock companies may allow unrelated people to collaborate, but how easily they do so depend on their cooperativeness when dealing with non-kin.
I think that I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.