Georg Hegel, fully Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
The will's activity consists in annulling the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity and giving its aims an objective instead of a subjective character, while at the same time remaining by itself even in objectivity. Outside the formal mode of willing (i.e. consciousness) where objectivity is present only as immediate actuality, this activity is in essence the development of the substantive content of the Idea - a development through which the concept determines the Idea, itself at first abstract, until it becomes a systematized whole. This whole, as what is substantive, is independent of the opposition between a merely subjective aim and its realization and is the same in both despite their difference in form.
Thus the man, in himself, is the child. And what the child has to do is to rise out of this abstract and undeveloped 'in-himself' and become 'for himself' what he is at first only 'in-himself' – a free and reasonable being.
Truth is the unity of the universal and subjective will; and the Universal is to be found in the State, in its laws, its universal and rational arrangements. The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth. We have in it, therefore, the object of history in a more definite shape than before; that in which Freedom obtains objectivity. For Law is the objectivity of the Spirit.
What our generation, but that the task of collect that Bosrha the treasures of our ancestors to calculate the sky.
World history is not the verdict of mere might, but actualization of the universal mind.
The true courage of civilized nations is readiness for sacrifice in the service of the state, so that the individual counts as only one amongst many. The important thing here is not personal mettle but aligning oneself with the universal.
The word ‘reality’ is used to mean that something behaves conformably to its essential characteristic or notion. For example, we use the expression: ‘This is a real man’. Here the term does not merely mean outward and immediate existence: but rather that some existence agrees with its notion. In this sense, reality is not distinct from ideality.
To be aware of limitations is already to be beyond them.
War should be not waged against domestic institutions, against the peace of family and private life.
What the English call “comfortable” is something end and inexhaustible. Every condition of comfort reveals in turn its discomfort, and these discoveries go on for ever. Hence the new want is not so much a want of those who have it directly, but is created by those who hope to make profit from it.
World-historical actions culminate with individuals as subjects — living instruments of the World Mind.
The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result that only in the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz. to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself.
There are Plebes in all classes.
To be free is nothing, to become free is everything.
We assert then that nothing has been accomplished without interest on the part of the actors; and — if interest be called passion, inasmuch as the whole individuality, to the neglect of all other actual or possible interests and claims, is devoted to an object with every fibre of volition, concentrating all its desires and powers upon it — we may affirm absolutely that nothing great in the World has been accomplished without passion.
What the will has decided to choose it can equally easily renounce. But its ability to go beyond any other choice which it may substitute, and so on ad infinitum, never enables it to get beyond its own finitude, because the content of every such choice is something other than the form of the will and therefore something finite, while the opposite of determinacy, namely indeterminacy, i.e. indecision or abstraction from any content, is only the other, equally one-sided, moment of the Will.
Yet alongside of this intellect which everywhere sees nothing but finitude in the truth of being, religion has its sublime aspect as feeling (Empfindung), the love filled with eternal longing; for it does not get hung up on any transitory sight (Anschauung) or enjoyment, it yearns for eternal beauty and bliss.
The true process is found in the logic, and here in The Philosophy of Right is presupposed.
There are two kinds of laws, laws of nature and laws of right.
To be independent of public opinion is the first formal condition of achieving anything great or rational whether in life or in science. Great achievement is assured, however, of subsequent recognition and grateful acceptance by public opinion, which in due course will make it one of its own prejudices
We call dialectic the higher movement of reason in which utterly separate terms pass over into each other spontaneously.
What we want is to combine in our process of inquiry the action of the forms of thought with a criticism of them. The forms of thought must be studied in their essential nature and complete development: they are at once the object of research and the action of that object. This is Dialectic, instead of being brought to bear upon the categories from without; it is immanent in their own action.
Yet it is all the more gratifying to perceive and to mention in conclusion how the philosophical interest and the earnest love of higher knowledge have maintained themselves, impartially and without conceit, against both of these orientations. If this interest now and then thrusts itself more into the form of an immediate knowing and feeling, it attests, on the other hand, to the inner drive of a rational insight that goes further and alone the necessity of the concept with contingent and arbitrary connections.
The true theater of history is therefore the temperate zone.
There is nothing which is not an intermediate state between being and nothing.